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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
tion may have been. A certain ring was mentioned in an undated
codicil as having been intended by the wife of the testator for a
previously deceased person. On several counts this bequest also
failed.
Succession of Schmidt 28 registers an attack on the mental
capacity of a testator. The rule of presumption of capacity was
reiterated and the proof found to be insufficient to overcome this
presumption. Succession of Lanata29 was cited for the proposi-
tion that even "interdiction, standing alone, would not ipso facto
incapacitate the interdict from making a will, but would only
have been evidence of her incapacity, to be considered with all
the other evidence."
TORTS
Dale E. Bennett*
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
The res ipsa loquitur exception to the general rule, that the
plaintiff must establish the fact of defendant's negligence by a
preponderance of the evidence, has been applied by our Louisi-
ana courts to a wide variety of situations.' In Allen v. Shreve-
port Theatre Corporation2 the plaintiff (theatre patron) was suing
for injuries sustained when the theatre ceiling fell during a per-
formance. In Mayerhefer v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Com-
pany3 the doctrine was applied to another of the innumerable
bottling cases.4 The plaintiff's cause of action arose out of the
drinking of a bottle of Coca-Cola that contained a harmful quan-
tity of free iodine.
Both of these cases squarely met the requirements of the doc-
trine. First, the accidents occurred under circumstances where
common experience strongly suggested negligence. Secondly,
the instrumentality (theatre) or process (bottling) causing the
28. 219 La. 675, 53 So. 2d 834 (1951).
29. 205 La. 915, 18 So. 2d 500 (1944).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. For a complete analysis of this problem, see Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur
and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases, 4 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 70 (1941).
2. 218 La. 11008, 51 So. 2d 607 (1951).
3. 219 La. 320, 52 So. 2d 866 (1951).
4. For a summary of this group of cases, see Note, 4 LOUISIANA LAW
REviw 606 (1942).
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harm was under the defendant's exclusive control or manage-
ment. To paraphrase this requirement, the defendant was in a
better position to prove his innocence than was the plaintiff to
prove his negligence.
The inference of negligence varies in res ipsa loquitur situa-
tions.5 Thus, the defendant in the theatre case could have refuted
the presumption of negligence by a showing that the defect was
a latent one, not discoverable by reasonable periodic inspections
of the ceiling. In the Coca-Cola case, however, the presence of a
foreign substance in the bottle raised an almost irrebuttable pre-
sumption of negligence. In this situation, evidence that the bot-
tling company's equipment is first class and that the procedures
followed are consistently careful is of little avail.
COLLISION WITH PARKED TRUCK-LAST CLEAR CHANCE
In Capitol Transport Company v. A. R. Blossman, Incorpo-
rated," the plaintiff sought to recover the value of a tractor and
tank-trailer unit destroyed when it was struck by a truck oper-
ated by defendant's driver at a high rate of speed. Defense coun-
sel, in addition to urging due care in the operation of defendant's
truck, alleged that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
in allowing the damaged truck to obstruct the highway for a
period of twelve hours after its tire had gone flat.7 After review-
ing the facts of the case, the supreme court sustained the defen-
dant's claim of contributory negligence and reversed a judgment
for the plaintiff.
It is significant to note that Justice McCaleb, who wrote the
opinion for a unanimous court, makes no mention of the possible
application of the doctrine of last clear chance. It might have
been argued that the plaintiff's negligence (leaving its truck on
the highway) was at rest at the time of the accident, as was the
negligence of the owner of the tethered donkey in the celebrated
English case of Davis v. Mann," while the defendant had an oppor-
tunity to avoid the collision by careful driving. From the
standpoint of categorical legal principles, a "last clear chance"
situation appears to have been presented. However, from the
5. See Malone, supra note 1.
6. 218 La. 1086, 51 So. 2d 795 (1951).
7. Other charges of negligence, in failing to have proper reflectors and to
completely remove the truck from the highway, were not sustained by the
evidence.
8. 10 M. & W. 546 (Exch. 1842),
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standpoint of comparative fault, it would certainly have been
unreasonable to have allowed recovery. We have a defendant
whose only fault was a failure to drive at such a rate of speed
that he could stop within the range of vision of .his lights-a
standard which, while clearly established by Louisiana decisions,9
is frequently disregarded in actual driving. We have a plaintiff
who is guilty of creating a serious traffic hazard by allowing his
disabled truck to obstruct the highway for an unnecessary
length of time and at night.
In another similar recent case, with the parties litigant
reversed, the supreme court allowed the night driver to recover
damages from the obstructor of the highway.10 There the court
decided, after considerable difference of opinion as to the basis
of allowing recovery, that the plaintiff's driver was not guilty of
negligence in failing to see the parked vehicle. Such a conclusion
of "no negligence" was not available to the night driver who was
a defendant in the Capitol Transport Company case. However,
the court could fall back upon the general defense of contributory
negligence of the driver of the parked truck.
Probably the last clear chance doctrine was not considered
because it was not raised by the plaintiff, for the issues on appeal
appeared largely to concern the existence of negligence in the
conduct of the respective parties. Again, the court may not have
considered the plaintiff's negligence at rest, since the driver of
the disabled truck was present and could always have averted the
accident by moving the vehicle. This might serve as a technical,
though rather tenuous, basis for ignoring the last clear chance
aspect of the case. As one reads this opinion, one senses an appli-
cation of a broader policy consideration-a trend in Louisiana
decisions to favor the night driver who fails to stop within the
range of his vision, over the person creating an obvious highway
hazard by leaving a vehicle or other obstruction thereon. In so
doing an element of comparative fault is indirectly injected into
Louisiana tort law. This may be foreign to the categorical tort
principles of the negligence-contributory negligence-last clear
chance cycle; but it is certainly compatible with a practical
administration of justice.
9. Sexton v. Stiles, 130 So. 821, 827 (La. App. 1930); Goodwin v. Theriot, 165
So. 342 (La. App. 1936); La. Power & Light Co. v. Saia, 173 So. 537 (La. App.
1937).
10. Dodge v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 214 La. 1031, 39 So. 2d 720 (1949),
discussed in 10 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 192 (1950).
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